Social norms, gender identity, and high-earning wives’ housework behavior in Japan: An identity economics framework by Ando Jun
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=mjes20
Download by: [Niigata Kokusai Joho Dai] Date: 08 March 2016, At: 00:11
The Japanese Political Economy
ISSN: 2329-194X (Print) 2329-1958 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mjes20
Social norms, gender identity, and high-earning
wives’ housework behavior in Japan: An identity
economics framework
Jun Ando
To cite this article: Jun Ando (2015) Social norms, gender identity, and high-earning wives’
housework behavior in Japan: An identity economics framework, The Japanese Political
Economy, 41:1-2, 36-51, DOI: 10.1080/2329194X.2015.1105675
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2329194X.2015.1105675
Published online: 07 Dec 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 31
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
THE JAPANESE POLITICAL ECONOMY
2015, VOL. 41, NO. 1–2, 36–51
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2329194X.2015.1105675
Social norms, gender identity, and high-earning
wives’ housework behavior in Japan: An identity
economics framework
Jun Ando
Faculty of International Studies, Niigata University of International and Information Studies,
Niigata, Japan
ABSTRACT
This article takes an identity economics perspective to examine
the housework behavior of Japanese wives of couples where
both spouses work full-time, based on panel data from the
Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers in 2000–2008. First, we
show that Japanese wives are reluctant to reduce their
housework time even when they out-earn their husbands.
Second, there is no negative linear relationship between wives’
absolute income and the time they allocate to unpaid work.
Last, we find no evidence that low-earning wives reduce their
time spent on housework more rapidly than high-earning wives
in Japan.
Introduction
The degree to which couples share housework duties (hereinafter: the
housework behavior of husbands and wives) has been widely investigated
by experts in the fields of sociology and economics. Scholars have predomi-
nantly relied on two major frameworks, namely, economic exchange and
gender display, and two key measures, the relative earnings share (RES) of
the husband or wife and the wife’s absolute income, to explain the division
of domestic labor between a couple. In contrast to earlier treatments of this
issue, the present study contributes to the body of knowledge on this topic
by utilizing the perspective of identity economics to examine the housework
behavior of Japanese wives in couples where both spouses work full-time
(defined as at least 35 hours a week in a regular job).
In this study, four hypotheses on the housework behavior of high-earning
wives in Japan are investigated, namely the economic-exchange hypothesis,
the gender-display hypothesis, and two autonomy hypotheses (Gupta 2006,
2007, 2009; Killewald and Gough 2010). First, responding to Sullivan’s
(2011) criticism that few recent studies have used longitudinal data to analyze
this topic, panel data for 2000–2008 from the Japanese Panel Survey of
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Consumers (JPSC; http://www.kakeiken.or.jp/en/JPSC/jpsc.html), conducted
by the Institute for Research on Household Economics, are used herein.
Second, wives’ RES and absolute income are estimated simultaneously in
the presented equations to consider Gupta’s (2007, 2009) assertion that when
this occurs, the former becomes insignificant and the latter shows signifi-
cance. Last, following Killewald and Gough (2010), a spline function is incor-
porated into the estimated equation to consider differences in the speed at
which wives’ earnings may reduce the time they spend on household chores
at different income levels.
Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) notion of identity economics incorporates
identity explicitly into the utility function in order to explain various beha-
viors that standard economics cannot. The economic-exchange hypothesis
with respect to income assumes that as their RES rises, husbands and wives
reduce their housework time. The gender-display hypothesis, in contrast,
asserts that working wives’ housework time is expected to decline until a
threshold is passed but then rise thereafter. In Japan, in spite of the Gender
Equal Employment Opportunity Law enacted in 1987 and the rises in their
RES, working wives still allocate much more time to household activities than
do their husbands. This study aims to prove empirically that the gender-
display model influences high-earning wives’ housework behavior. From an
identity economics point of view, gender display in housework is said to arise
from losses in gender identity on the wives’ side through cognitive dissonance
in the social interactions between husbands and high-earning wives, who
deviate more from women’s behavioral norms as to market labor than do
low-earning wives working part-time. In this regard, high-earning wives in
Japan try to compensate for the decreases in their husbands’ utility, as well
as for their own gender, by playing the role of a “good wife.” Because Japanese
society is still heavily influenced by Confucianism, gender-role consciousness
is deeply rooted in the country, as compared to Europe and the United States.
According to the White Paper on Gender Equality published in 2013 by the
Japanese Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office (2013), the proportion of
supporters of gender traditionalism gradually declined until 2012, but then
began to rise again. This trend confirms the pattern found herein: High-
earning wives in Japan following traditional gender norms trade housework
time with their husbands and spend time on household chores even though
their high earnings would enable them to outsource much of this domestic
work. Indeed, Ando (2011a) suggests that when husbands work shorter hours
than their wives, most men choose to trade housework time with their wives
independent of any loss of gender identity, whereas wives, who are assumed to
lose their gender identity to a larger degree, are unlikely to pass over more of
the housework burden to their husbands. Although they do not directly refer
to gender-identity loss, some studies find that wives in Japan have traditional
gender roles and attitudes, and that husbands have a smaller housework share
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or fewer housework hours (Ando 2013; Kamo 1994; Matsuda 2004; Tsuya and
Bumpass 2004).
A number of Japanese sociologists have examined the high amount of
housework carried out by wives relative to their husbands, including time
spent on childcare (Ishii-Kuntz 2004; Matsuda 2004, 2005, 2006; Matsuda
and Suzuki 2002; Mizouchi 2006; Nagai 2001). However, most have
explored the economic-exchange hypothesis, which incorporates only the
linear term of the RES of husbands or wives. Fundamentally, the gender-
display hypothesis has been used to explain the housework behavior of
couples in European countries, Australia, and the United States (Bittman
et al. 2003; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Greenstein 2000; Gupta 2007,
2009; Gupta and Ash 2008; Kan 2008; Killewald and Gough 2010; Usdansky
and Parker 2011). However, because Japan has a different cultural approach
to the formation of gender identity, scholars must examine the gender-
display hypothesis empirically. To the author’s best knowledge, only Ando
(2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012–13a, 2012–13b) employs both models, gender-
display and autonomy, in order to examine housework division among
husbands and wives in Japan. However, Ando (2010, 2011b, 2012–13a,
2012–13b) draws contradictory conclusions, which arise by not taking
account of the relationship between wives’ RES and their absolute incomes
in the estimated equations. Therefore, in an attempt to clarify the mixed
findings, these hypotheses on the housework behavior of high-earning
wives in Japan are investigated in this article with the methodological
improvements mentioned above.
If the gender-display hypothesis is supported, it means that the gender
norm “married women should not work full-time and earn as much as their
husbands” still exists in Japanese society. On the contrary, if the economic-
exchange or autonomy hypothesis is supported, other things being equal, rises
in working wives’ income enable them to reduce their housework time.
Hence, policymakers should aim to increase the opportunities for women
to be employed full-time even after childrearing, for example by eliminating
the wage gap between the two genders. Thus, this study can contribute to
advancing research on this subject not only in Japan but in other, culturally
similar countries (e.g., South Korea).
Existing theories
The economic-exchange hypothesis assumes that husbands and wives would
trade their housework time with their RES. For example, as the RES of wives
increases, they decrease their housework time. Graphically, if we plotted
wives’ housework time on the y-axis and their RES on the x-axis, the resultant
graph would be linear, with a positive intercept and a negative slope. A
number of economists have aimed to explain housework behavior from
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game-theoretic perspectives by using this so-called economic-exchange model
(Lundberg and Pollak 1993, 1996; Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and
Horney 1981).
On the contrary, the gender-display model, initially proposed by Brines
(1994), asserts that wives do decrease their housework time at first, but gradu-
ally become reluctant to abandon housework as their RES rises. Hence, once
wives out-earn their husbands, they begin to undertake marginally more
household chores.
The results of previous studies based on these two models, however, are
inconsistent. For instance, Brines (1994), using data from wave 20 of the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID; http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu),
shows that the gender-display model explains the housework behavior of
U.S. husbands, whereas the economic-exchange model accounts for that
of their wives. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) investigate housework share
by constructing an identity-based model of economic behavior. They show
that although husbands undertake more housework as their work share
decreases from 100 percent, when their work share drops below a certain
level, they demonstrate reluctance to accept additional domestic chores.
The authors explain this behavior from the viewpoint of the loss of ident-
ity on the part of husband and wife. Greenstein (2000), based on data
derived from the 1987–1988 National Survey of Families and Households
(http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/nsfh), confirms that gender-display theory influ-
ences the housework time of both husbands and wives when their shares
of total housework are employed as a dependent variable. Bittman et al.
(2003) find that the gender-display model accounts for the housework
behavior of Australian wives and American husbands, whereas the econ-
omic-exchange model explains the housework share of American wives;
however, neither model explains the behavior of Australian husbands. In
the same vein, Evertsson and Nermo (2004) show that the gender-display
model explains the behavior of American husbands and wives in certain
years of their study period, while the economic-exchange model explains
the behavior of Swedish couples for all years. However, Kan (2008) finds
no evidence to support gender display in the housework behavior of cou-
ples when taking employment status into consideration independent of
their gender.
Killewald and Gough (2010), using the 1976–2003 waves of the PSID,
investigate the compensatory gender-display and autonomy models by
restricting the sample to married or long-term cohabiting couples (<60 years)
in which both spouses work full-time. The results of their cross-sectional and
panel models demonstrate that the compensatory gender-display model
accounts for wives’ housework behavior. Usdansky and Parker (2011) restrict
their sample to couples in which the wife is employed full-time and show that
only wives without a college degree and with children at home rely on gender
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display to determine housework share. For the case of Japanese husbands and
wives, as noted in the Introduction, Ando (2011b, 2012–13a, 2012–13b)
presents mixed findings.
The third model typically used to explain wives’ housework behavior rather
than that of husbands is the autonomy model. This model hypothesizes that
wives’ absolute earnings, not their RES, explain their housework behavior
from two standpoints. Gupta (2006, 2007, 2009) challenges the practice of
including RES as an independent variable when estimating the housework
behavior of wives, arguing that their absolute income has a negative and stat-
istically significant association with time spent on domestic work. Gupta
(2007, 2009) shows that wives’ absolute income eliminates the significance
of their RES in the gender-display model and has a negative linear relation-
ship with time allocated to domestic work (the autonomy hypothesis). In
effect, this finding demonstrates that the income of married or cohabiting
working women is negatively and significantly related to their housework
hours, while their partners’ incomes are negatively but insignificantly associa-
ted with housework time.
In line with the autonomy hypothesis, Killewald and Gough (2010), focus-
ing on the fact that even high-earning wives spend much of their time on
housework, point out that there inevitably remain some housework chores
that cannot be easily outsourced by purchasing substitutes in the market.
For example, some housework cannot appropriately be outsourced: Doing
housework is associated with being a “good wife”; unlike dining out, house-
cleaning implies revealing a degree of privacy to domestic workers; some
substitutes are difficult to forgo because of the high cost incurred; and
husbands are reluctant to do housework (Killewald and Gough 2010). The
authors find support for their hypothesis that the earnings of wives at the
low end reduce more rapidly as compared with wives at the high end. In other
words, there is a negative but nonlinear relationship between wives’ absolute
income and their time spent on domestic labor. Similarly, Killewald (2011),
using the 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 waves of the Consumption and Activities
Mail and the Health and Retirement Study Core surveys, finds a negative and
significant relation between U.S. dual-earner married women’s earnings and
their time spent on household chores. Usdansky and Parker (2011) also show
that wives’ income is inversely and significantly related to their housework
hours.
Theoretical framework
Model
This study uses identity economics (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), which intro-
duces the concept of identity into the individual utility function in order to
40 J. ANDO
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explain why economic agents may display nonrational behavior, as shown in
Equations (1) and (2):
Uj ¼ Uj aj; a  j; Ij
  �
ð1Þ
Ij ¼ Ij aj; a  j; cj; ej;P
  �
ð2Þ
where Uj is person j’s utility, Ij is j’s identity or self-image, and aj, a–j, cj, ej, and P
are the vectors of j’s actions, of others’ actions, the social categories assigned to
j, j’s own given characteristics, and social prescriptions, respectively. Equation
(1) means that j’s utility depends on j’s own actions as well as on the actions
of others and on j’s identity, and Equation (2) shows that j’s identity depends
not only on the actions of j and those of others but also on the behavioral
norms of the social category assigned to j and the extent to which j’s character-
istics match them. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) claim that the utility function Ij
provides the social status of a category, and that increases or decreases in utility
derive from gains or losses in identity. For husbands, a social behavioral norm
holds that a man should work or a man should earn. By contrast, one of the
social behavioral norms for wives is that a woman should do the housework.
Therefore, husbands’ smaller work shares or RES violate their social norm,
and thus their utility decreases through their loss in identity. When a wife sees
her husband working less than she does, or when his work share is smaller than
hers is, she loses her identity and does housework or undertakes a larger house-
work share in an attempt to restore her husband’s identity and maximize their
utility by conforming to their social norms.
Model specification
The theoretical framework used in this study fundamentally follows the mod-
els used by Gupta (2006, 2007, 2009) and Killewald and Gough (2010). First,
Equation (3) is estimated to test the economic-exchange, gender-display, and
Gupta’s autonomy hypotheses:
Model I Y ¼ a0 þ a1X þ a2X2 þ a3H þ a4W þ bZ þ e1 ð3Þ
In addition to Equation (3), Model II in Equation (4) is estimated to test the
economic-exchange, gender-display, and Killewald and Gough’s autonomy
hypotheses:
Model II Y ¼ a0 þ a1X þ a2X2 þ a3H þ a51SplineW1 þ a52SplineW2
þ a53SplineW3 þ a54SplineW4 þ a55SplineW5 þ e2 ð4Þ
where Y is wives’ housework time in minutes per day on weekdays allo-
cated to domestic work including childcare, X is wives’ RES, and H and
W are the absolute earnings of husbands and wives, respectively. SplineWk
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(K¼ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) stands for a spline function where wives’ annual earnings
are divided into five intervals of ¥2 million at 2005 constant prices and
each dot is connected by a linear function. For instance, SplineW1 is the
interval of wives’ earnings of ¥2 million or less, SplineW2 represents ¥2–
4 million, SplineW3 ¥4–6 million, SplineW4 ¥6–8 million, and SplineW5
¥8 million or more. Z is a vector of the control variables, and ek (k¼ 1
and 2) is an error term. The expected sign of a1 is negative for the econ-
omic-exchange hypothesis. For the gender-display hypothesis, the signs of
a1 and a2 are negative and positive, respectively; a2 represents the curvi-
linear effect, which reduces wives’ marginal decreases in housework time
as their RES marginally rises. The expected sign of a3 is unknown, but
it is assumed to be positive if the husband’s “money talks” and negative
if his absolute income is spent on purchasing goods and services in the
market; a4 is assumed to show a negative sign if the two autonomy
hypotheses are true. In particular, when all four variables for each interval
of a spline function show negative signs and meet the condition a51 < a52 <
a53 < a54 < a55 < 0, Killewald and Gough’s autonomy hypothesis is
supported.
Because it is assumed that wives’ housework behavior is affected by
time-invariant effects, such as their personal taste for housework, gender
norms, and the extent to which they feel it appropriate to outsource some
household chores, fixed-effects (FE) models are estimated for both equa-
tions. However, random-effects (RE) models are also estimated for these
equations. To decide which model should be selected, the Hausman test
is conducted.
Sample
The Institute for Research on Household Economics has conducted the JPSC
since 1993. Cohort A consists of a group of 1,500 women aged between 24 and
34 in 1993. Cohort B, consisting of 500 women aged between 24 and 27,
cohort C, consisting of 836 women aged between 24 and 29, and cohort D,
consisting of 636 women aged between 24 and 28, were added to cohort A
in 1997, 2003, and 2008, respectively. The sample is restricted to working
married women of couples where both spouses were employed full-time
and where neither husband nor wife changed their respective workplaces
during the year, which makes it possible to increase the representation of
high-earning husbands and wives. Respondents with missing values, those liv-
ing apart from their spouses, and cases where either spouse was a student,
retired, or unemployed were excluded from the sample. Consequently, the
sample comprised 982 women aged 25–49 married to husbands aged between
23 and 59.1
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Variables
Dependent and independent variables
The dependent variable in this study is wives’ housework time in terms ofminutes
perday allocated todomesticwork, including childcare. The independent variables
are wives’ RES and its squared term as well as the annual absolute incomes of
husbands and wives. Absolute income consists of labor income from employers
aswell as nonlabor earnings, such as social security benefits, income fromproperty,
and so on. It should be noted that because the JPSC asks respondents to provide
annual income for the previous year, absolute income in the following year is used.
Control variables
The control variables are work hours per day on weekdays, educational
attainment, and age for both husband and wife. Other variables used are:
number of children, whether the couple has no child, whether the youngest
child is a preschooler or an elementary school student, whether the couple
resides with the husband’s or wife’s mother, whether the couple resides with
a daughter aged 20 years and above, whether the husband works full-time,
and the size of the municipality in which the couple resides.
According to the time-availability hypothesis, the more time a spouse
spends time on market labor, the less will he or she allocate to housework
and the more the other spouse’s housework time rises. Therefore, the expected
signs of the coefficients of the work hours of husbands and wives are positive
and negative, respectively.
Generally, husbands who have a higher educational attainment are considered
highly egalitarian, meaning that they undertake housework and spend more of
their time on it than husbands who have a lower education, which leads to the
expectation that husbands raise their housework time while that of wives is
reduced. By contrast, wives who have a higher educational attainment are
assumed to have a higher consciousness of egalitarianism, thereby reducing their
own housework hours and asking their husbands to participate in domestic work
to a larger degree than previously. Following the definitions provided by the
JPSC, 1 means junior high school, 2 vocational college and school (only for
respondents who did not graduate from high school), 3 high school, 4 vocational
college and school (only for respondents who graduated from high school), 5
junior college and technical college, 6 college, and 7 graduate institution.
With regard to age, it is commonly considered that the older the respondent,
the less egalitarian he/she is and the more conservative with regard to traditional
gender roles. This leads to the assumption that older husbands and those married
to older wives spend relatively less time on household tasks, while older wives and
those married to older husbands allocate more time to domestic chores.
In egalitarian societies, wives are likely to take responsibility for childrear-
ing until the children no longer need to be supported or when there are more
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children than the mother is able to support herself. The number of children is
thus assumed to raise wives’ housework time, especially that part of it spent
on childrearing, and particularly when their youngest child is a preschooler
or in elementary school. Childless wives, on the other hand, are assumed to
allocate less time to domestic work. Therefore, the youngest child as a
preschooler or an elementary school student is coded 1, and 0 otherwise,
while no children is coded 1, and 0 otherwise. If the wife resides with her
or her husband’s mother or with a daughter, they could be a substitutable
human resource for her, reducing her housework time. Thus, the wife residing
with her or her husband’s mother is coded 1, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the
wife residing with a daughter aged 20 years and above is coded 1, and 0
otherwise. With respect to husbands’ employment status, wives married to
husbands working full-time are not assumed to reduce the time they allocate
to household chores by much compared to those married to husbands work-
ing part-time. Therefore, a wife married to a husband employed full-time is
coded 1, and 0 otherwise. With regard to the size of the municipality in which
the couple resides, the largest city is coded 3, a large city 2, and others 1. The
variable is assumed to show a negative sign, because the larger the city size,
the greater is the supply of goods and services that are substitutable for
housework.
Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The mean of wives’ house-
work time per day (on a weekday) is 190.88 minutes. Husbands spend 613.72
minutes on paid work per day, on average, compared with 530.11 minutes
per day for wives. In spite of their having the same employment status, the
mean work times of husbands and wives are statistically significantly different
at the 0.1 percent level. Similarly, the means of annual income at 2005 constant
prices are also significantly different at the 0.1 percent level (¥5,521.8 thousand
for husbands, and ¥3,825.8 thousand for wives). Thus, wives’ RES is 0.40, on
average. In contrast, mean educational attainment is similar for both spouses
(4.27 for husbands vs. 4.31 for wives). In fact, there is no statistically significant
difference even at the 10 percent level. Finally, the mean ages of husbands and
wives are 39.30 and 37.13 years, respectively, which are significantly different.
The mean of the dummy variable for couples with no children is 0.26,
which means that 74 percent of couples in the sample have children; however,
the average number of children is 1.41, reflecting the low fertility rate in
Japan. Of all couples, 28 percent and 34 percent have children aged 0–6
and 7–12, respectively, most of whom are preschoolers and/or elementary
school students, while 38 percent have the mother of either husband or wife
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residing with them, and 4.6 percent have a daughter aged 20 or over living
with them. The mean size of the residential district is 2.02.
Results
The results of the two models examined herein are presented in Table 2. The
results of the Hausman test support the FE model for both models. First,
wives’ economic-exchange hypothesis is supported by Model I but rejected
by Model II, and, second, in contrast to the results, the gender-display
hypothesis is supported by Model II, which accounts for the level of wives’
earnings. This finding implies that the housework behavior of high-earning
wives in Japan is affected by the gender-display model. Third, Gupta’s
autonomy hypothesis is rejected by Model I. Last, Killewald and Gough’s
autonomy hypothesis is rejected by Model II (all the coefficients at the five
income levels are positive). In Model II, all five variables for each interval
of the spline function are positively related to wives’ housework time, and four
out of five are significant.
While wives’ time spent on paid work is negatively related to their time
spent on unpaid work, husbands’ work time is positively and significantly
related to wives’ time on domestic chores (albeit showing a weak relationship
in Model II). For both partners, educational attainment is negatively but insig-
nificantly correlated to wives’ time allocated to household chores. However,
age and, unexpectedly, number of children do not significantly affect wives’
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (n¼ 982).
Variable Min Max M SD
Wife’s housework time on weekdays (minutes) 0.000 570.000 190.876 97.590
Husband’s work time on weekdays (minutes) 120.000 1320.000 613.717 109.156***
Wife’s work time on weekdays (minutes) 360.000 840.000 530.112 65.402
Husband’s annual real income at 2005 prices (¥10,000) 23.277 2629.017 552.175 221.976***
Wife’s annual real income at 2005 prices (¥10,000) 9.737 3214.064 382.578 208.300
Wife’s real income: ¥0–2,000,000 (n¼ 135) 9.737 199.586 133.973 49.515
Wife’s real income: ¥2,000,000–3,999,999 (n¼ 448) 200.000 399.803 292.642 54.490
Wife’s real income: ¥4,000,000–5,999,999 (n¼ 277) 400.000 599.210 486.822 56.019
Wife’s real income: ¥6,000,000–7,999,999 (n¼ 99) 600.000 799.605 675.812 54.671
Wife’s real income: ≥¥8,000,000 (n¼ 23) 800.000 3214.064 1075.921 486.312
Wife’s RES 0.016 0.832 0.402 0.112
Husband’s educational attainment 1.000 7.000 4.270 1.676
Wife’s educational attainment 1.000 7.000 4.307 1.214
Husband’s age 23.000 59.000 39.300 7.158***
Wife’s age 25.000 49.000 37.126 6.081
Number of children 0.000 4.000 1.407 1.059
Dummy: no children living with couple 0.000 1.000 0.257 0.437
Dummy: youngest child is preschooler 0.000 1.000 0.263 0.440
Dummy: youngest child is elementary student 0.000 1.000 0.246 0.431
Dummy: husband’s or wife’s mother living with couple 0.000 1.000 0.378 0.485
Dummy: daughter aged ≥20 living with couple 0.000 1.000 0.045 0.207
Size of town 1.000 3.000 2.023 0.629
Note: ***represents statistically significant at 0.1%.
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time spent on domestic work. Nevertheless, the results state that childless
wives spend significantly less time on household labor than wives who have
children. Further, the youngest child being a preschooler or an elementary
school student significantly raises wives’ housework time, although the latter
is not significant in Model II. Finally, if the husband’s or wife’s mother lives in
the same house, this is negatively and significantly correlated with the wife’s
time allocated to unpaid work, while the presence of a daughter aged 20 or
over is not significant. The positive association between size of district and
wives’ housework time is insignificant even at the 10 percent level.
Conclusion
This study adopted an identity economics framework in order to examine the
housework behavior of Japanese wives of couples where both spouses work
full-time, based on 2000–2008 JPSC panel data. Two equations were
estimated to test the economic-exchange hypothesis, the gender-display
hypothesis, and Gupta’s and Killewald and Gough’s autonomy hypotheses
for wives, allowing us to highlight three main findings. First, in contrast to
the predictions of standard economics, when wives’ RES rises, they lose their
gender identity causing them to trade their housework time with that of their
husband in order to regain their lost gender identity and utility. This finding
is consistent with those of Greenstein (2000) for the United States, Bittman
et al. (2003) for Australia, Evertsson and Nermo (2004) for Sweden and
the United States, and Ando (2011b, 2012–13a, 2012–13b) for Japan.
Specifically, wives decrease their time spent on unpaid work until their
RES rises to 65.2 percent; however, once their RES exceeds this share, they
begin to increase it again.
Second, the autonomy hypotheses both of Gupta and of Killewald and
Gough were rejected: Wives’ absolute income does not have a negative
relationship with their time spent on household activities. Rather, surprisingly
and in contrast to the findings of previous studies, the existence of Japanese
wives’ earnings increases their time allocated to domestic work.2
Third, although wives’ absolute income raises their housework time, the
marginal increase in time spent on household chores diminishes as their level
of marginal earnings increases. The theory of rational time allocation allows
us to conclude that as their wage rate rises, wives allocate more time to market
labor and less to household work, which enables them to earn enough to
purchase substitutes in the market and lower the burden of domestic work;
however, this was not shown to be the case with high-earning Japanese wives.
Specification checks were conducted by changing the sample restriction.
These checks showed that the gender-display hypothesis holds when using
JPSC 2005–2008 panel data and for wives working full-time irrespective of
their husbands’ employment status. However, this hypothesis does not hold
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for wives working part-time, wives of couples where husbands work full-time
and wives work part-time, and wives working part-time or full-time.3 A speci-
fication check was also performed for Models I and II by using the squared
term of husbands’ RES measure and excluding the linear term of the measure
and the spline functions from the two models, respectively. In Ando (2011b,
2012–13a, 2012–13b), gender display was found in the results of the model
that excluded the linear term of husbands’ RES from the gender-display
model (Model I in the present study), but the hypothesis was not confirmed
when only the squared term of the measure of husbands was used in the speci-
fication check.
All the presented findings suggest that it is too early to end the dispute over
gender display in housework, even though skepticism about using multivari-
ate analyses to examine the gender-display model have been expressed by
Gupta (2007, 2009), Gupta and Ash (2008), Killewald and Gough (2010),
and Sullivan (2011).
In contrast to conventional economic theories, identity economics
explains the behavior of economic agents by incorporating identity into
the utility function and assuming that agents lose identity when they choose
actions contrary to the social behavioral norms assigned to their social
categories and thereby experience cognitive dissonance. Indeed, the results
in the present study firmly imply that the behavioral norm that “married
women should not work full-time and earn as much as their husbands” still
exists in Japanese society. Therefore, Japan should aim to change the beha-
vioral norm to one that assumes that married women may work full-time
and earn as much as their husbands in order to enable them to pursue a
better work/life balance, one of the most important goals for the Japanese
government.
Notes
1. The JPSC uses the terms “regular (worker)” and “irregular (worker)” in the survey. These
are similar to “full-time (worker)” and “part-time (worker),” respectively. This study,
following previous works, uses the latter terms.
2. This finding might arise for four reasons, First, because Japanese houses are smaller than
those in the United States and European countries, and because of the efficiency of mod-
ern cleaning products, Japanese wives rarely outsource home-cleaning. Second, although
wives in Japan make use of prepared food at home (e.g., bought from a delicatessen,
frozen food, box lunches), this is not a complete substitute for preparing home-cooked
dishes and, rather, requires them to provide freshly prepared food as a complement.
Third, according to the Statistics Bureau of Japan, fewer than 20 percent of Japanese
households own an electric dishwasher (only rising to 30 percent for the highest-income
households). Finally, the deflation and stagnation in real income in the past decade
in Japan have prevented even high-earning wives from outsourcing housework in order
to reduce household expenditure.
3. The empirical results are available from the author upon request.
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